Transport 2026: The Infrastructure Graveyard (Part 2)

The projects that never quite die — studied, redesigned, deferred, and debated for years, but rarely delivered.

Introduction: Not cancelled. Not built. Just… still coming

Some transport projects fail quickly and cleanly. They are cancelled, disestablished, or rejected through planning law.

Others follow a slower, uniquely New Zealand path.

They are announced. Studied. Re-scoped. Re-costed. Consulted. Rebranded. Re-announced.

Years pass. Elections change. Governments change. Agencies restructure.

Yet the project never actually begins.

These are not abandoned projects. They are permanent proposals.

And in many ways, they shape the national transport conversation more than projects that actually get built.

Because they absorb time, attention, and political capital — without ever putting a shovel in the ground.

Why this matters ahead of Election 2026

Heading into an election cycle, large transport promises inevitably return:

  • new crossings

  • new rapid transit lines

  • new corridors

  • transformative upgrades

But history shows many of these projects already have decades-long backstories.

Understanding that history helps separate:

• genuinely ready-to-deliver infrastructure from • ideas that are still conceptual, risky, or politically fragile

This article examines the second group.

Case Study 1: Waitematā Harbour Crossing (Auckland)

The longest-running proposal in the country

Few projects illustrate New Zealand’s "study loop" better than Auckland’s second harbour crossing.

For decades, reports, investigations, and options studies have explored:

  • additional road tunnels

  • rail tunnels

  • light rail

  • walking and cycling links

  • combined multimodal solutions

Each cycle restarts with similar objectives:

  • resilience

  • capacity

  • growth on the North Shore

  • network redundancy

Yet the project remains perpetually in the future.

What keeps happening

The pattern is consistent:

  1. Technical investigations identify multiple viable concepts

  2. Costs escalate into multi‑billion‑dollar territory

  3. Funding certainty weakens

  4. Political consensus fades

  5. The project returns to “further study”

In the meantime, incremental fixes continue on the existing bridge.

What this teaches

Large, once‑in‑a‑generation megaprojects often fail not because they are impossible — but because they are too large to survive short political cycles.

They require decade-long commitment. New Zealand’s three-year election cycle rarely allows that stability.

Case Study 2: East–West Link (Auckland freight corridor)

From motorway to redesign to reset

The East–West Link began life as a major road connection between SH20 and Onehunga/Penrose, framed primarily around freight efficiency.

Over time it has been:

  • challenged through the courts

  • redesigned

  • downsized

  • reframed as “network optimisation”

  • revisited through fresh investment cases

Rather than a single build, it has become an evolving concept.

The reality

Despite years of analysis and significant planning cost, the corridor still lacks a clear, committed delivery pathway comparable to completed motorway projects.

What this teaches

Projects tied to industrial land use, local impacts, and environmental concerns tend to enter long consultation cycles where every iteration changes scope and cost.

By the time consensus forms, the original problem has often changed.

Case Study 3: Wellington mass rapid transit after Let’s Get Wellington Moving

A vision without a vehicle

After the dissolution of Let’s Get Wellington Moving, the need for better public transport in Wellington did not disappear.

But the mechanism to deliver it did.

The result is a familiar pattern:

  • continued discussion of light rail or bus rapid transit

  • corridor protection

  • future planning

  • no near-term construction timeline

The consequence

Strategic agreement exists on the problem. Delivery structure does not.

Without a single accountable owner, projects stall at the concept stage.

What this teaches

Governance clarity is often more important than engineering feasibility.

Case Study 4: Rapid transit extensions that remain “strategic conversations”

Across Auckland and other cities, multiple rail and busway extensions have lived for years in long-term plans:

  • rail extensions to growth areas

  • busway continuations

  • airport links

  • regional rail concepts

They appear in transport strategies, spatial plans, and election material.

But without secured funding and procurement pathways, they remain aspirational rather than operational.

This is not failure — but it is not delivery either.

For operators and communities, the distinction matters.

The pattern: New Zealand’s "Study Loop"

Across these examples, a common delivery pattern emerges:

Study → Consult → Re-scope → Re-cost → Re-study → Election → Repeat

Each step is rational on its own.

Together, they can stretch timelines beyond a decade before construction even begins.

During that time:

  • costs inflate

  • priorities change

  • political appetite resets

  • the original case weakens

By the time a decision is needed, starting again can seem easier than finishing.

Why this happens here more than elsewhere

Several structural features of the New Zealand system contribute:

1. Short electoral cycles

Three-year terms encourage caution on very large, long-term commitments.

2. Multi-agency governance

Shared ownership spreads responsibility and slows decisions.

3. Extensive consultation requirements

Valuable for legitimacy, but time-consuming for corridor-scale projects.

4. Small market, big costs

Major infrastructure often carries per-capita costs that feel disproportionate to voters.

5. Preference for perfection

Projects expand to solve every problem at once, increasing risk and price.

Why this matters for Transport 2026

As parties release policies ahead of the election, many proposals will sound new.

In reality, several will be the latest iteration of ideas that have circulated for 10–20 years.

This history does not make them bad ideas.

But it does change the question voters and operators should ask.

Not:

"Is this a good project?"

But:

"Is this genuinely ready to deliver in the next term — or still in the study loop?"

That distinction is what Transport 2026 aims to clarify.

What comes next

Part 3 will step back further and examine the systemic reasons New Zealand struggles to deliver megaprojects — identifying the six recurring failure modes and what practical changes could improve delivery certainty.

It will also provide a framework for assessing upcoming party proposals against historical reality.

This article forms part of Kiwi Coaches’ Transport 2026 project — independent, non-partisan analysis of New Zealand transport infrastructure, policy, and delivery.

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Transport 2026: The Infrastructure Graveyard (Part 3)

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Transport 2026: The Infrastructure Graveyard (Part 1)